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Abstract
In all major industrialized countries the population is aging over
time, reducing the fraction of the population in working age. Conse-
quently labor is expected to be scarce, relative to capital, with an ensu-
ing decline in real returns on capital and increases in real wages. This
paper employs a large scale OLG model with intra-cohort heterogene-
ity to ask what are the distributional consequences of these changes in
factor prices induced by changes in the demographic structure. Since
these demographic changes occur at di®erent speed in industrialized
economies we develop a multi-region (the US, the European Union,
the rest of the OECD and the rest of the world) open-economy model
that allows for international capital °ows. This allows us to evaluate to
what extent the distributional consequences of changing factor prices
¤We thank the participants of the 2005 Cleveland FED International Macroeconomics
conference for many useful comments. The authors can be reached at: Krueger: De-
partment of Economics and Business; Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University Frankfurt
am Main; Mertonstr. 17; PF 81; 60054 Frankfurt; Germany; dirk.krueger@wiwi.uni-
frankfurt.de. Ludwig: MEA, Universitt Mannheim; L 13, 17; 68131 Mannheim; Germany;
ludwig@mea.uni-mannheim.de.
1for the US and Europe are mitigated or accentuated by the fact that
the population is aging at di®erent rates elsewhere in the world.
As a result of the aging of the population worldwide, the return to
capital is declining by about half a percentage point from year 2005
until 2080 and gross wages are increasing substantially. However, tak-
ing the increasing burden of PAYG ¯nanced social security systems
into account, net wages are predicted to decline quite dramatically -
by roughly 8 percent in the US and 11 percent in the European Union.
These two regions also are predicted to run substantial current account
de¯cits in the later part of the 21st century, as capital is °owing back
to these regions from the rest of the world.
In order to document the distributional consequences of the de-
mographic transition within and across generations, we analyze the
evolution of Gini coe±cients for earnings, income, consumption and
wealth. We ¯nd that earnings, income and consumption are slightly
more equally distributed in 2080 than in 2005, but that wealth is
slightly more unequally distributed. In order to evaluate the wel-
fare consequences of the demographic transition across generations,
we ask the following hypothetical question: suppose a household born
in 1950, the initial steady state of our model, would live through the
economic transition with changing factor prices induced by the demo-
graphic change (but keeping her own survival probabilities constant at
their 1950 values), how would its welfare have changed, relative to a
situation without a demographic transition? We ¯nd that households
experience signi¯cant welfare losses due to the demographic transition,
in the order of 1% of consumption for cohorts born in 1950 and increas-
ing to roughly 6% for cohorts born in 2000. These losses are mainly
due to the fact that lower future returns to capital make it harder for
households to save for retirement and due to the decline of net wages in
their working lives. The welfare losses we document have to be traded
o® against the potential welfare gains from a longer (and healthier) life
that is part of the source of the aging of the population (lower birth
rates are the other source), and whose welfare bene¯ts we are agnostic
about in this paper.
1 Introduction
In all major industrialized countries the population is aging, over time re-
ducing the fraction of the population in working age. Consequently the
capital labor ratio is expected to increase, with ensuing declines in real re-
turns on capital and increases in real wages. This paper employs a large
scale OLG model with intra-cohort heterogeneity to ask what are the distri-
butional consequences of these changes in factor prices induced by changes
2in the demographic structure. Since these demographic changes occur at
di®erent speed in industrialized economies we develop a multi-region (the
US, the European Union and the rest of the OECD) open-economy model
that allows for international capital °ows. This allows us to evaluate to what
extent the distributional consequences of changing factor prices for the US
and Europe are mitigated or accentuated by the fact that the population is
aging at di®erent rates elsewhere in the world.
In order to answer the questions posited we develop a three region open
economy version of the standard large scale-overlapping generation model
pioneered by Auerbach and Kotliko® (1987) and enriched by intra-cohort
heterogeneity, as in Imrohoroglu et al. (1995), Conesa and Krueger (1999)
and many others.
Both extensions of the basic Auerbach-Kotliko® model are necessary
for the question we want to address. First, intra-cohort heterogeneity will
endogenously give rise to some agents deriving most of their income from
returns to capital, while the income of others is mainly composed of labor
income. Abstracting from this heterogeneity does not allow a meaningful
analysis of the distributional consequences of changes in factor prices. Sec-
ond, in light of substantial di®erences in the evolution of the age distribution
of households across regions, it is important to allow for capital to °ow from
regions with a larger old-age dependency ratio to those with a larger share
of workers in the population. In this way the e®ects on returns to capital
of demographic changes is potentially mitigated for regions with rapidly ag-
ing population, and accentuated for those regions with a slower population
aging process.
[TO BE COMPLETED]
[SOME OF THE LITERATURE TO BE CITED: Domeij-Floden, Fer-
oli, Attanasio-Kitao-Violante, Brooks, Hendriksen, Fehr-Jokisch-Kotliko®,
Brsch-Supan-Ludwig-Winter; Abel]
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple ana-
lytical model that allows us to illustrate the major e®ects at work in our
quantitative exercise. Our quantitative model is presented in Section 3. We
describe our thought experiment in Section 4 and discuss some technical de-
tails on calibration and the solution method in Section 5. Our main results
are presented in Section 6. Sections 7 contains various forms of sensitivity
analyses asking some substantive questions with respect to the roles of pen-
sion reforms and openness as well as less substantive questions with respect
3to some modeling issues. Section 8 concludes.
2 A Simple Model
In this secition we construct a simple two period OLG model that is a special
case of our quantitative model in the next section. We can characterize
equililibria in this model analytically, and aim at providing some intuition
for the quantitative results derived below. We are especially interested in the
in°uence of demographic variables and the size and structure of the social
security system on the direction and dynamics of international capital °ows.
In every country i there are Nt;i young households that live for two
periods and have preferences representable by the utility function
log(c
y
t) + ¯ log(co
t+1)
In the ¯rst period of their lives households work for a wage wt; and in the
second period they retire and receive social security bene¯ts bt+1;i that are




t + st = (1 ¡ ¿t;i)wt;i
co
t+1 = (1 + rt+1)st + bt+1;i
where rt+1 is the real interest rate between period t and t + 1 and ¿t;i is
the social security tax rate in country i: We assume that capital °ows freely
across countries, and thus the real interest rate is equalized across the world.




where Zi is the country-speci¯c technology level and At = (1 + g)t is ex-
ogenously growing productivity. Thus we allow for di®erences in technology
levels across countries, but not its growth rate. We fursther assume that
capital depreciates fully after use in production.
The production technology in each country is operated by a representa-
tive ¯rm that behaves competitively in product and factor markets. Pro¯t
maximization of ¯rms therefore implies that
1 + rt = ®k®¡1
t
wt;i = (1 ¡ ®)ZiAtk®
t ; (1)
4where




is the capital stock per e±ciency unit of labor.
We assume that the social security system is a pure pay-as-you-go (PAYGO)
system that balances the budget in every period. Therefore
¿t;iwt;iNt;i = bt;iNt¡1;i









Equilibria in this model can be characterized analytically. For that purpose
we ¯rst solve the household problem and then aggregate across households
(countries).
2.1.1 Optimal Household Savings Behavior





wt;i(1 ¡ ¿t;i) ¡
bt+1;i
(1 + ¯)(1 + rt+1)
(2)







t;i is the gross growth rate of the young cohort in country i between
period t ¡ 1 and t:1 Using this expression for bene¯ts and substituting out
for wages and interest rates from (1) in (2) yields
st;i =








1The population of a country iat time t is given by
Popt;i = Nt;i + Nt¡1;i






For further reference, de¯ne by ~ Nt =
P
i ZiNt;i the e±ciency weighted world




~ Nt the relative share of the e±ciency-
weighted population in country i and by ~ °N
t =
~ Nt
~ Nt¡1 the growth rate of
aggregate (world) e±ciency weighted population.









ZiAt+1Nt+1;i = kt+1At+1 ~ Nt+1 (4)















Using this in (4) and simplifying yields
kt+1 = ¾(~ °N



















®(1 + ¯) + (1 ¡ ®)¿a
t+1
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denoting the average social security contribution rate in the world and °A =
1 + g is the growth rate of the technology.
Equation (5); as a function of the policy and demographic parameters of
the model, describes the dynamics of the aggregate capital stock, given the


























t;i measures both the population growth rate as well as the age
distribution in the economy.





i ZiN0;i : Here s¡1;iN¡1;i denotes total assets held
by the initial old generation in country i:
Since, from the ¯rms' ¯rst order condition, interest rates are given by
1 + rt = ®k®¡1
t
the dynamics of the real interest rate is given by






with initial condition 1 + r0 = ®k®¡1
0 :
Finally, we can characterize international capital °ows. Net foreign as-
sets of country i at the beginning of period t+1 (or the end of period t) are
given by
Ft+1;i = Nt;ist;i ¡ Kt+1;i = Nt;ist;i ¡ ZiAt+1Nt+1;ikt+1
=
µ





























~ µ t+1) (6)
determines the size and sign of net foreign assets to GDP of country i:



















is the growth rate of output in
country i:
2.2 Qualitative Results
2.2.1 Balanced Growth Path
Let the growth rates of populations and social security tax rates be constant
over time. Then in a balanced growth path the economy is growing at rate






®(1 ¡ ®)¯(1 ¡ ¿a)
~ °N°A (®(1 + ¯) + (1 ¡ ®)¿a)
¶ 1
1¡®
Evidently the steady state capital stock per labor e±ciency units is strictly
decreasing in the e®ective population growth rate of the world, ~ °N as well
as the average social security contribution rate of the world economy, ¿a.
The reverse is true for the world interest rate.
In the balanced growth path, net foreign asset positions and the current
account of country i are given by2
fi =





i (1 ¡ ¿a)(®(1 + ¯) + (1 ¡ ®)¿i)








Thus our simple model has the following qualitative predicitions. First we
observe that in the empirically relevant case that ~ °N
i °A > 1; the sign of the
current account coincides with that of the net foreign asset position. Thus
we focus our discussion on the later.
1. If all countries have identical population growth rates and social secu-
rity contribution rates (~ °N
i = ~ °N and ¿i = ¿a), then net asset positions
and current accounts are zero in the long run.
2. If all countries have the same size of the social security system (¿i =
¿a), then
fi =








Thus countries with higher than world average population growth have
a negative net asset position and current accounts, countries with lower
than average population growth rates have positive net asset positions
and current accounts. Capital °ows from old to young regions.
3. If all countries have identical population growth rates (~ °N
i = ~ °N) then
fi =




(1 ¡ ¿a)(®(1 + ¯) + (1 ¡ ®)¿i)
(1 ¡ ¿i)(®(1 + ¯) + (1 ¡ ®)¿a)
¸





8and countries with higher than average social security contribution
rates, ¿i > ¿a have negative net asset positions and current accounts,
those with lower contribution rates have positive net asset positions
and current accounts.
4. Higher population growth rates, ceteris paribus3, reduce the net asset
position of a country in the BGP. The same is true for higher social
security contribution rates.
2.2.2 Dynamics
As long as ~ °N
t+1°A ¸ 1; the economy converges monotonically from its initial
condition to the balanced growth path characterized in the last section. We
can explicitly characterize this dynamics. De¯ne as percentage deviation
from the balanced growth path
^ kt = log(kt) ¡ log(k¤)
We then can then write
^ kt+1 = ^ ¾t + ®^ kt (8)
where
^ ¾t = log(¾t=¾¤
t)
= log(1 ¡ ¿a









log ~ °N ¡ log°A¢
¡
¡
log(®(1 + ¯) + (1 ¡ ®)¿a
t+1) ¡ log((®(1 + ¯) + (1 ¡ ®)¿a¤))
¢
(9)
Equation (8); in conjunction with equation (9) can be used to deduce the
impulse response of the capital stock per worker (and thus the total capital
stock etc.) with respect to shocks in population growth rates and social
security contribution rates. Also note that
^ rt = rt ¡ r¤ ¼ log(1 + rt) ¡ log(1 + r¤) = ¡(1 ¡ ®)^ kt
so one can easily deduce the dynamics of returns to capital from the dy-
namics of capital itself. Also, using the results in (6) and (7) in conjunction
with (9) allows to deduce the dynamics of the net asset position and the cur-
rent account following a shock in population growth rates or social security
contribution rates.
[TO BE COMPLETED]
3Strictly speaking, an increase in ~ °
N
i or ¿i change ¿
a as well. This is meant by ceteris
paribus. Also note that a meaningful balanced growth path does not exist with country
heterogeneity in ~ °
N
i :
93 The Quantitative Model
In this section we describe the quantitative model that we use to evaluate
the consequences of demographic changes around the world for international
capital °ows and their consequences for the returns to capital and wages, as
well as the distributional consequences emanating form these changes.
In our quantitative work we consider (at most) four countries/regions:
the US, the European Union, the rest of the OECD and the rest of the
world.
3.1 Demographics
The demographic evolution in the countries of interest is taken as exogenous
(that is, we do not model fertility, mortality or migration endogenously) and
as the main driving force of our model.
Households start their economic life at age 20; retire at age 65 and life
at most until age 95: Since we do not model the ¯rst 19 years of a household
explicitly, we denote its twentieth year of life by j = 1; its retirement age
by jr = 45 and the terminal age of life by J = 85: Households face an
idiosyncratic, time- and country-dependent probability of surviving from
age j to age j + 1; which we denote by st;j;i:
For each country i 2 f1;:::;Ig we have data or forecasts for populations
of model age j 2 f1;:::;85g at time t = f1950;:::;2400g; denoted by Nt;j;i:





3.2 Endowments and Preferences
Households value consumption and, if the labor-leisure choice is endogenous,












4For simplicity we assume that all migration takes place at or before age j = 1 in
the model, so that we can treat migrants and agents born inside the country of interest
symmetrically.
10where ¯ is the time discount factor and expectations are taken over idiosyn-
cratic survival probabilities and stochastic labor productivity, described
now.
Households are heterogenous with respect to age, their deterministic
earnings potential and their stochastic labor productivity. All these sources
of heterogeneity a®ect a household's labor productivity and thus wages.
First, households labor productivity di®ers according to their age; let "j
denote average age-speci¯c productivity of cohort j:
Second, each household belongs to a particular group k 2 f1;:::;Kg
that shares the same average productivity µk: Di®erences in groups stand
in for di®erences in education or ability, characteristics that are ¯xed at en-
try into the labor market and a®ect a group's relative wage. We introduce
these di®erences in order to generate part of cross-sectional income and thus
wealth dispersion that does not come from our last source of heterogeneity,
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. That is, lastly, a household's labor pro-
ductivity is a®ected by an idiosyncratic shock ´t 2 f1;:::;Eg that follows
a time-invariant Markov chain with transition probabilities
¼(´t+1j´t) > 0:
Let ¦ denote the unique invariant distribution associated with ¼: Therefore,
labor productivity of a household of age j; in group k and with idiosyncratic
shock ´t is given by
µk"j´t:
3.3 Technology
In each country the single consumption good is being produced according




where Yt;i is output in country i at date t; Kt;i and Lt;i are labor and capital
inputs and At;i is total factor productivity at time t in country i:The parame-
ter ® measures the capital share and is assumed to be constant over time and
across countries. Furthermore, in each country capital used in production
depreciates at a rate ±; again assumed to be time- and country-independent.
Since in each country production takes place with a constant-returns to scale
production function and since we assume perfect competition, the number
of ¯rms is indeterminate in equilibrium and without loss of generality we
assume that in each country a single representative ¯rm operates.
113.4 Government Policies
In the benchmark model the government simply collects assets of households
that die before age J and redistributes them in a lump-sum fashion among
the citizens of the country as accidental bequests Trt;i: As sensitivity analysis
we explore also how our results are a®ected by the presence of a pure pay-as-
you-go public pension system, whose taxes and bene¯ts have to be adjusted
to the demographic changes in each country.
This social security system is modelled as follows. On the revenue side,
households pay a °at payroll tax rate ¿t;i on their labor earnings. Retired
households receive bene¯ts ...[To be completed]
3.5 Market Structure
In each period there are spot markets for the consumption good, for labor
and for capital services. Whereas the labor market is a national market
where labor demand and labor supply are equalized country by country, the
markets for the consumption good and capital services are international in
that goods and capital can °ow freely, and without any transaction costs,
between countries. The supply of capital stems from households in all coun-
tries who purchase capital as assets in order to save for retirement and to
smooth out idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The supply of consumption
goods stem from the representative ¯rms in each country.
Again, as sensitivity analysis we explore how the US would be a®ected
by its demographic changes if it were a closed economy. In that exercise the
capital used by US ¯rms equals the assets that US citizens accumulate for
life cycle and precautionary reasons.
3.6 Equilibrium
Individual households, at the beginning of period t; are indexed by their
group k; their country of origin i; their age j; their idiosyncratic productivity







¼(´0j´)W(t + 1;i;j + 1;k;´0;a0)g (10)
s:t: c + a0 = wi;tµk"j´l + (1 + rt)a + Tri;t
a0;c ¸ 0 and l 2 [0;1]
12where wi;t is the wage rate per e±ciency unit of labor and rt is the real
interest rate. We denote the cross-sectional measure of households in country
i at time t by ©t;i We then can de¯ne a competitive equilibrium as follows.
De¯nition 1 Given initial capital stocks and distributions fK0;i;©0;igi2I a
competitive equilibrium are sequences of individual functions for the house-
hold, fW(t;¢);c(t;¢);l(t;¢);a0(t;¢)g1
t=0; sequences of production plans for ¯rms
fLt;i;Kt;ig1
t=0;i2I; prices fwt;i;rtg1




1. Given prices, transfers and initial condition, W(t;¢) solves equation
(10); and c(t;¢);l(t;¢);a0(t;¢) are the associated policy functions.












3. Transfers are given by
Tri;t+1 =
R
(1 ¡ st;j;i)a0(t;i;j;k;´;a)©t;i(dj £ dk £ d´ £ da) R







































if a0(t;i;j;k;´;a) 2 A
k 2 K;j + 1 2 J
0 else
and for newborns
©t+1;i(f1g £ K £ E £ A) = Nt+1;i;1
½
¦(E) if 0 2 A
0 else
De¯nition 2 A stationary equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which
all individual functions are constant over time and all aggregate variables
grow at a constant rate.
4 The Thought Experiment
The exogenous driving process of our model is a time-varying demographic
structure. We allow country speci¯c survival, fertility and migration rates
to change over time, inducing a demographic transition from an initial dis-
tribution towards an new steady state population distribution that arises
once all time changes in these rate have been completed and the population
structure has settled down to its new steady state. Induced by this transi-
tion of the population structure is a transition path of the economies of the
model, both in terms of aggregate variables as well as cross-sectional dis-
tributions of wealth and welfare. Summary measures of these changes will
provide us with answers as to how the changes in the demographic struc-
ture of the economy, by changing returns to capital and wages, impacts the
distribution of welfare over time and across people in the economy.
[TO BE COMPLETED]
5 Calibration
In this section we discuss how we specify the parameters for our benchmark
model. This entails choosing parameters governing the demographic tran-
sition, the preferences and endowment speci¯cation of households and the
production technology by ¯rms. We take as length of the period one year.
145.1 Demographics
Throughout the world, demographic processes are determined by the demo-
graphic transition that is characterized by falling mortality rates followed
by a decline in birth rates, resulting in population aging and reducing the
population growth rate (in some countries, even turning it negative). While
demographic change occurs in almost all countries across the world, extent
and timing di®er substantially. Europe and some Asian countries have al-
most passed the closing stages of the demographic transition process while
Latin America and Africa are only at the beginning stages (Bloom and
Williamson, 1998; United Nations, 2002).
We focus on three di®erent groups of industrialized countries, the US,
the European Union and all other OECD countries. All demographic pa-
rameters used in the model can be deduced from our data for populations
for these three regions, broken down by age groups. These population num-
bers determine both the idiosyncratic survival probabilities as well as the
relative sizes of total populations in the three countries/regions in all time
periods under consideration.
Figure 1 illustrates the di®erential impact of demographic change on
total population numbers and population growth rates for the period 1950-
2100. As the right panel shows, the US, while also experiencing a decrease of
population growth rates, will have positive population growth rates also in
the far distant future, whereas population growth rates drop below zero for
the other two regions. Europe starts from low levels of population growth
and population growth numbers are negative after 2005.
Figure 2 shows the impact of demographic change on working-age pop-
ulation ratios - the ratios of the working-age population (of age 15-65) to
the total population - and old-age dependency ratios - the ratio of the work-
ing age population to the old-age population (of age 65+). As the ¯gure
illustrates, the three regions are di®erentially a®ected by the impact of demo-
graphic change: While working-age population ratios decrease in all regions
(and old-age correspondingly increase), these e®ects are much stronger in
the EU and the other OECD countries (ROECD). In terms of levels, the EU
is the oldest region, but the ¯gure also shows that the speed of demographic
change is slightly higher in ROECD.
[FIGURES TO BE ADDED]
155.2 Endowments and Preferences
Households start their life with no assets and are endowed with one unit of
time per period. Labor productivity is given by the product of three compo-
nents, a deterministic age component "j, a deterministic group component
µk and a stochastic idiosyncratic component ´:
The age-productivity pro¯le f"jgJ
j=1 is taken from Hansen (1993) and
generates an average life-cycle wage pro¯le consistent with the data. Con-
ditional on age, the natural logarithm of wages is given by
log(µk) + log(´):
We choose the number of groups to be K = 2 and lets groups be of equal
size. We choose fµ1;µ2g such that average-group productivity is equal to 1
and the variance of implied labor incomes of entrants to the labor market
coincides with that reported by Storesletten et al. (2004). This requires
exp(µ1) = 0:73 and exp(µ1) = 1:27:
For the idiosyncratic part of labor productivity we use a 2 state Markov
chain with persistence parameter ½ = 0:98 and implied conditional variance
of 8%.5





where ¾ governs the relative risk aversion of the household and · measures
the relative importance of consumption, relative to leisure. In the bench-
mark economy we set ¾ = 2 and · = 1; that is, assume that labor supply is
exogenously given at l = 1:
In addition we have to specify the time discount factor of households.
We choose a ¯ such that the resulting world return on capital equals to
2:5%. This requires a ¯ = 0:9677:
5.3 Technology
The capital share is assumed to time- and country-invariant and to equal
® = 0:36: As depreciation rate we choose ± = 8% on an annual level. For the
sequence of country-speci¯c productivity levels At;i we choose a structure
At;i = Ai(1 + g)t
5We are in the process of generating results with a Markov chain with more than two
states, which is not conceptually di±cult but time-consuming.
16where g is the common productivity growth rate and Ai is a country-speci¯c
productivity constant. In our benchmark calibration we set g = 0: We choose
the Ai such that relative outputs per capita in our model for the three regions
coincide with that in the data for an average for the period 1950 to 2005:
This requires an AUS = 1:2; AEU = 0:95; ARE = 0:855
[TO BE COMPLETED]
6 Results for the Benchmark Model
[TO BE COMPLETED]
6.1 Measuring International Capital Flows
In order to document our results about the direction and size of international
capital °ows we will document the evolution of the current account and the
net asset position of the countries/regions under consideration. De¯ne the
net foreign asset position of country i at time t at the beginning of period t
as
Ft;i = At;i ¡ Kt;i
The current account in period t is then de¯ned as the change in the net
asset position of a country,
CAt;i = Ft+1;i ¡ Ft;i:
When reporting these statistics we will always divide them by output Yt;i:
Note that in a closed economy Ft;i = Ct;i = 0; and that in a balanced growth






CAt;i = 0 for all t:
6.2 Aggregate Variables
[TO BE COMPLETED]
6.3 Distributional and Welfare Consequences of the Demo-
graphic Transition
In this section we document who bene¯ts and who loses from the demo-
graphic transition. In performing this exercise we have to take into account
17that household's lifetime utility is bound to change simply because in ex-
pectation they live longer over time. We therefore ¯rst describe the thought
experiment we carry out in order to quantify the welfare conseqeunces from
the demographic transition
A household's welfare is a®ected by two consequences of the demographic
change. First, her lifetime utility changes because her own survival prob-
abilities increase; this is in part what triggers the aging of the population
(the other source are declines in birth rates). Second, due to the demo-
graphic transition she faces di®erent factor prices and government transfers
and taxes (from the social security system and from accidental bequests)
than without changes in the demographic structure.
We want to isolate the welfare impact of the second e®ect. For this we
compare lifetime utility of agents born and already alive in 2006 under two
di®erent scenarios. For both scenarios we ¯x a household's individual sur-
vival probabilities at their 2005 values; of course they fully retain their age-
dependence. Then we solve each household's problem under two di®erent
assumptions about factor prices and taxes/transfers. Let W(t;i;j;k;´;a)
denote the lifetime utility of an agent at time t ¸ 2006 in country i with
individual characteristics (j;k;´;a) that faces the sequence of equilibrium
prices as documented in the previous section, but constant 2005 survival
probabilities, and let W2006(t;i;j;k;´;a) denote the lifetime utility of the
same agent that faces prices and taxes/transfers that are held constant at
their 2006 value. Finally, denote by g(t;i;j;k;´;a) the percentage increase
in consumption that needs to be given to an agent (t;i;j;k;´;a) at each
date and contingency in her remaining lifetime (keeping labor supply al-
locations ¯xed) at ¯xed prices to make her as well o® as under the sit-
uation with changing prices.6 Negative numbers for g(t;i;j;k;´;a) thus
indicate that households su®er welfare losses from the general equilibrium
e®ects of the demographic changes.7 Of particular interest are the num-
bers g(t = 2006;i;j = 1;k;´;a = 0); that is, the welfare consequences for
newborn agents in 2006 (remember that newborns start their life with zero
assets).
6For the Cobb-Douglas utility speci¯cation for ¾ 6= 1 the number g(t;i;j;k;´;a) can








7We alos computed these numbers taking 1950 as the base year of comparison. The
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A Details of the Demographic Projections
For each country i 2 f1;:::;Ig we base our demographic data on the o±cial
demographic data and projections by the United Nations (United Nations,
2002). Starting from a given initial age-distribution of population, N1950;j;i,
in year t = 1950 for actual age j 2 f0;:::;96g demography in each year t is
given recursively by





where mt;i;j(ft;i;j) denotes time, age and country speci¯c migration (fertility)
rates. Our assumption, that migration rates are zero for ages above 19 allows
us to treat newborns and immigrants in the economic model alike, compare
footnote 4.
The United Nations provide demographic data on Nt;i;j, st;i;j and ft;i;j
on an annual basis for the years 1950-2050, but for age-groups of ¯ve only.
We interpolate the initial distribution of the population, N1950;i;j, and the
data on st;i;j and ft;i;j for all t 2 f1950;:::;2050g between age-groups to
get age-speci¯c data. As for migration we use the UN data on aggregate
migration, Mt;i, and assume that migration numbers are equally distributed
across ages for j 2 f1;:::;19g. These approximations result in a decent ¯t
of our demographic model to the o±cial UN ¯gures.
20We further forecast demography beyond the UN forecasting horizon un-
til 2400. First, while holding fertility rates constant, we assume that life-
expectancy continues to increase at constant rates until year 2100. We then
hold age-speci¯c survival rates constant and assume that fertility rates ad-
just such that the number of newborns is constant in each successive year
until 2200. This adjustment procedure implies that stationary population
numbers are reached in year 2200. To support the steady state in our eco-




The idea is to iterate on the Euler equation, heavily using ideas developed in
Carroll (2005). The dynamic programming problem of the household reads
as
W(t;i;j;k;y;a) = max
c;a0 fu(c) + ¯st;i;j
X
y0
¼(y0jy)W(t + 1;i;j + 1;k;y0;a0)g
s:t: c + a0 = wtµk"jy + (1 + rt)a + Trt
a0;c ¸ 0
where t indexes time, i indexes country, k indexes type, j indexes age, ´
the idiosyncratic income shock and a asset holdings. First de¯ne as cash at
hand
x = wtµk"jy + (1 + rt)a + Trt




fu(x ¡ a0) + ¯st;i;j ¤
X
y0
¼(y0jy)V (t + 1;i;j + 1;k;y0;wt+1"j+1y0 + (1 + rt+1)a0 + Trt+1)g
The Euler equation reads as
u0(c) ¸ ¯st;i;j(1 + rt+1)
X
y0
¼(y0jy)V 0(t + 1;i;j + 1;k;y0;wt+1"j+1y0 + (1 + rt+1)a0 + Trt+1)
= if a0 > 0 (11)
21and the envelope condition reads as
V 0(t;i;j;k;y;x) = u0(c) (12)
The algorithm will operate on (11) and (12):
1. Make a grid for savings
A = f0;a2;:::;anag
2. Make a grid on x for the last generation
Xt;i;nj;k;y = fx1;:::;xnag
One may want to pick xnx > ana; e.g. xnx = ·ana; with · > 1:
Furthermore choose x1 = xmin > 0; but small. Furthermore let nx =
na + 1:
3. Economic theory tells us that
c(t;i;nj;k;y;x) = x
a0(t;i;nj;k;y;x) = 0
for all x 2 Xt;i;nj;k;y: From (12)
V 0(t;i;nj;k;y;x) = u0(c(t;i;nj;k;y;x))
V (t;i;nj;k;y;x) = u(c((t;i;nj;k;y;x)))
4. Now iterate on j; j = nj ¡ 1;:::;1: Given that we know the function
V 0(t + 1;i;j + 1;k;y;x) from the previous step, do the following






¼(y0jy)V 0(t + 1;i;j + 1;k;y0;wt+1"j+1y0 + (1 + rt+1)a0 + Trt+1)
3
5
for numbers (c1;:::;cna): Since
wt+1"j+1y0 + (1 + rt+1)a0 + Trt+1 = 2 Xt+1;i;j+1;k;y0
in general, this will involve interpolation of the function V; for
which it may be useful to do the interpolation on a transformed
version of V 0: See the remark below.
22(b) Equiped with the consumption numbers, de¯ne the grid Xt;i;j;k;y
by
x1 = xmin
xl+1 = al + cl for l = 1;:::;na
and the consumption function
c(t;i;j;k;y;x1) = xmin
c(t;i;j;y;k;xl+1) = cl for l = 1;:::;na
a0(t;i;j;k;y;x1) = 0
a0(t;i;j;k;y;xl+1) = al for l = 1;:::;na




= u(c(t;i;j;k;y;x)) + ¯st;i;j ¤
X
y0
¼(y0jy)V (t + 1;i;j + 1;k;y0;wt+1"j+1y0 + (1 + rt+1)a0(t;i;j;k;y;x) + Trt+1)
The updating of the value function again involves interpolation,
for which one may want to use a transformation of V:
B.2 A Note on Interpolation
We have V 0(t;i;j;k;y;x) on Xt;i;j;k;y; and now want to compute it on x 2
(xl;xl+1): One way is simply to have
V 0(t;i;j;k;y;x) ¼ ®1V 0(t;i;j;k;y;xl) + (1 ¡ ®1)V 0(t;i;j;k;y;xl+1)
where ®1 is the appropriate weight. If V 0 is highly nonlinear, this may yield
a bad approximation. But now suppose that a transformation of V 0; call it
W; is truly linear, where W = g(V 0): If we know V 0 on Xt;i;j;k;y; we know
W on Xt;i;j;k;y: Then
W(t;i;j;k;y;x) = ®1W(t;i;j;k;y;xl) + (1 ¡ ®1)W(t;i;j;k;y;xl+1)
without any approximation error, and thus
V 0(t;i;j;k;y;x) = g¡1 [W(t;i;j;k;y;x)]
= g¡1 [®1W(t;i;j;k;y;xl) + (1 ¡ ®1)W(t;i;j;k;y;xl+1)]
= g¡1 [®1g(V (t;i;j;k;y;xl)) + (1 ¡ ®1)g(V (t;i;j;k;y;xl+1))]
23without any approximation error. Of course this is true only if the true W
is really linear. Carroll proposes to use ??? as transformation
[TO BE COMPLETED]
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